Historians and journalists commonly survey other historians on the relative greatness of American presidents, and these rankings show remarkable consistency between surveys. In this paper we consider commonalities between highly ranked presidents and compare plausible determinants of greatness according to historians. We find that a strong predictor of greatness is the fraction of American lives lost in war during a presidents tenure. We find this predictor to be robust and compare favorably to other predictors used in previous historical research. We discuss potential reasons for this correlation and conclude with a discussion of how historians views might affect policy.
"War, he observed, made it easier for a president to achieve great- What makes U.S. presidents great? The ways of judging presidential greatness will vary from person to person. But one thing that is likely to affect many peoples judgments of presidents, especially presidents who died decades or even more than a century ago, is the views of historians. So let's narrow the question:
how do historians rank presidents? While the criteria differ among historians, this paper investigates what patterns can be found in the rankings and seeks to provide a plausible explanation for these patterns. Specifically, we investigate the connection between presidents' greatness rankings and the intensity of the wars that those presidents carried on. Using multiple regression analysis, we compare the effect of war intensity with other explanations offered by previous researchers in the field.
One measure of intensity of a war, one that is United States-centric, is the number of Americans killed in the war. In this article, we examine the relationship between historians rankings of U.S. presidents and the proportion of Americans killed in wars in which the U.S. government was engaged during the various presidents times in office. We find a strong positive correlation between the number of Americans killed during a presidents time in office and the president's rating.
The paper proceeds as follows: the first section reviews the literature on presidential greatness; the second describes the data and presents the model for 1 
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the determination of presidential greatness; the third presents a discussion of our empirical results; the fourth section concludes.
The Literature on Presidential Greatness
In 1948, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger asked fifty-five historians to rate U.S. presidents as Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average, or Failure. The standard given to the raters was each president's performance as president, not performance or achievements before or after being president. Since then, there have been many other surveys of historians on presidential greatness.
2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., discussing the surveys taken before 1997, writes:
Of national crises, war is the most fateful, and all the top ten save
Jefferson were involved in war either before or during their pres- To the extent this is true, this means that one way not to "suffer the barbs of history" is to insert the U.S. government into war and/or not avoid war when other countries governments take hostile actions.
Much of the literature on president greatness is psychological in nature. In this literature, researchers tend to focus on personal characteristics of presidents.
The leading research psychologist in this area is Dean Keith Simonton. His model has six predictors of historians rating of presidential greatness: years in office, the number of years in the president's time in office when the country was at war, whether the president was assassinated, whether the president was a war hero, the president's intelligence, and whether the president was involved in a major scandal while in office. Table 1 describes the data, the full data set can be found in Appendix 1. Reagan at war when he sent Marines to Lebanon or when he invaded Grenada?
Rather than making a judgment call on these wars, we take Simonton's "years at war" variable as given. However, because we are adding our own variable for the number of people killed in war, we use the common-sense idea that if Indians were certainly widely regarded at the time to be "on the other side."
Fortunately, including the number of American Indians killed in the number of dead would not have a great effect on our data analysis.
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There is one major exception to our statement that we allocated deaths to the president on whose watch the deaths occurred. That exception is George Washington. Washington was the leader of the revolutionary armed forces during the Revolutionary War, but his time in office was well after the Revolutionary War ended. Nevertheless, we counted the war deaths during the Revolutionary War as being on his watch. We think that makes sense given his important position during the war and given that he almost certainly would not have been President had he not led the military part of the Revolution. One cannot say the 4 In his famous letter to Horace Greeley, Lincoln wrote:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. (Lincoln 1862) same thing about Theodore Roosevelt, whose role during the Spanish-American war was important, but not nearly as important as George Washington's role in the Revolutionary War. How about Eisenhower? His stature during World
War II was close to that of George Washington during the Revolutionary War.
Yet we do not count World War II deaths as being on his watch. The reader will certainly note some arbitrariness here.
Results
Our empirical model takes the following form:
where Score is the C-SPAN score, the first independent variable, RealGdpGrowth, is the same as the one used in Curry and Morris, the next six independent variables are the same as the ones used in Simonton and in Curry and
Morris, and MDPC rank corresponds to that president's relative rank of American military combat deaths divided by the population during that president's tenure, with rank 1 meaning the most military combat deaths per capita. about GDP as a measure of economic wellbeing need not concern us here. The collinearity between military deaths per capita and GDP is likely to be the result of both deaths and GDP being driven by war. Therefore, whereas Curry and Morris argue that GDP growth is more important than war in affecting presidential rankings, the opposite is more likely to be true: big wars, all else equal, cause historians to rank presidents highly.
Beyond the issue of statistical significance is the more-important issue of economic or historical significance. Our variable, military deaths per capita, even though statistically significant, would be relatively unimportant if a onerank difference in deaths per capita had little effect on the presidential ranking.
But such is not the case. A one-rank difference on the deaths per capita scale has a large effect on presidential ranking. Indeed, a one-rank difference on deaths per capita has an effect on presidential ranking equal to the effect of a 1.8-percentage-point increase in annual real per capita growth. As is well known, an increase in annual GDP growth by 1.8 percentage points is huge.
These results are robust to slight variations and different econometric tests.
The statistical significance of the military deaths per capita rank variable remains strong, although diminished, when the top 3 presidents (FDR, Lincoln, and Washington) are removed from the sample.
Furthermore, we ran the regressions as an ordered probit model and retained a highly statistically significant relationship between the greatness rating and the military deaths per capita rank: Figure 3 Using the ordered probit model with other significant variables from Curry and Morris, we find GDP growth not significant at even the 90% level. 
Conclusion
Our data analysis suggests that wars in which a large percentage of the U.S.
population is killed will, all other things equal, cause historians to judge as great a president on whose watch those wars occurred. Certainly, this was the perception of presidents Theodore Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. It was probably also the perception of other presidents.
This conclusion is troubling. Most presidents, after all, probably want to be thought of as great. When they spend resources on war, they are spending almost entirely other peoples money -and lives. The danger is that modern presidents understand these incentives. Those who want peace should take historians' ratings of presidents seriously. Beyond that, we should stop celebrating, and try to persuade historians to stop celebrating, presidents who made unnecessary wars. One way to do so is to remember the unseen: the war that didn't happen, the war that was avoided, and the peace and prosperity that resulted. If we applied this standard, then presidents
Martin van Buren, John Tyler, Warren G. Harding, and Calvin Coolidge, to name four, would get a substantially higher rating than they are usually given.
